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!ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of High-Order Risk Attitudes on Bank’s Loan Policy 
 
by 
LUO Yuchen 
Master of Philosophy 
 
It is well known that prudence plays an important role in the process of decision 
making under uncertainties. However, how prudence affects a bank's decision on ex-
tending fixed rate or variable rate loan has not yet been fully examined. In this dis-
sertation, I use definition of second-order expectation dependence to further identify 
conditions for the risk prudent (imprudent) bank under state-dependent framework to 
refrain from extending fixed rate loans. Furthermore, using a set of actual data, I ap-
ply a recent developed inference procedure for testing positive expectation depend-
ence to demonstrate the significance of my work in empirical applications. In the end, 
a non-parametric calibration is conducted and the result is highly consistent with the 
prevalence of banks that have preference for adjustable rate mortgage in U.S. 30-year 
prime mortgage market.
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vency against its failure and the “protection” is paid by innocent third parties such as 
tax payers. Given that, A TBTF firm is “protected” against downside risk and this 
can lead to serious moral hazard excessive risk-taking concerns. Despite the in-
creased concern after the 2008 financial crisis, a report from International Monetary 
Fund (2014) shows that the TBTF issue seems not fully solved. Prudence and impru-
dence, known as the third-order risk attitudes, are introduced to economic literature 
to describe a decision maker’s preference when facing risk allocation, in particular, 
downside risk. In prior studies, banks are presumably perceived of risk-averse pref-
erence. However, what role the third-order risk attitude plays in the decision making 
process has not been investigated.  
  As convincingly argued in Li (2011), the more information about the risk attitude, 
the weaker dependence conditions on distribution (Here refers to expectation de-
pendence) we can achieve. Thus, I aim to re-examine the competitive bank’s optimal 
decision of loan contract under SED and third-order risk attitude in an equivalent 
framework of Wong (2013). My goal is to find a testable solution for the optimal 
choice of a bank facing the uncertainty of cost of fund.  
  My finding shows that the sufficient but not necessary condition for the bank to 
refrain from extending fixed rate loans are that (1) the spread between fixed rate and 
variable rate is non-positive (2) the marginal cost of fund is positively second-order 
expectation dependent on the state of economy and (3) the bank exhibits correlation 
loving and cross imprudence. The result is model-free with minimal assumption of 
specific form of utility functions and restrictions on probability density function.  
  In addition, with the assumption of imprudence, I use a set of hand-collected data 
from U.S. 30-year prime mortgage market to conduct a non-parametric calibration. 
The calibration result is highly consistent with the prevalence of variable rate loans. 
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It is, in effect, the first attempt to investigate the third-order risk attitude in an empir-
ical environment. 
  My work is appealing not only because of its first attempt in an empirical setting 
with its non-parametric orientation and minimal assumptions about distribution and 
utility function, but also of its novel attempt in the study of higher order risk attitude. 
Besides, the test on the signs of FED and SED provides meaningful implication to 
future economics and financial studies.  
  The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 is the literature review. 
Chapter 3 includes hypotheses tests and delineates theoretical model. Chapter 4 is the 
empirical application. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation.  
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LITERATUER REVIEW 
Prior Study  
To my best knowledge, Santomero (1983) is the first paper to dicuss the the nature of 
the choice between fixed and variable loan contracts and derives the conditions 
which determine the optimal quantity of each. In his paper, he constructs a relatively 
more complex model, in which credit risk, interet rate risk, contract terms, the risk of 
the project itself and funding technique are considered. In the end, he provides a 
mean-variance solution of a given loan portfolio and suggests that ceteris paribus, 
variable rate contract is a more efficient way for a risk-averse bank to shift interest 
rate risk when project returns are positively correlated with the movement in interest 
rates. He further points out that the phenomenon that floating rate loans have in-
creased as a percentage of the total within 1977-1982, moving from 36.7% to 77.8% 
at the year-end 1982, is the consequence of increasing variance of market interest 
rate and due to banks’ risk-averse preference.  
  Similar to Santomero (1983), under the investigation of mismatched portfolio in 
which a part of fixed rate loans is financed by variable rate liabilities, Chang et al. 
(1995) pints out that the expected spread between fixed rate and variable rate is 
responsible for a crucial rule in the decision making process, which responds 
positively to an increase in the volatility of the funding cost, in the bank's risk 
aversion, and in the competitive profit margin on variable rate loans. The paper 
further explains that the spread can be viewed as a risk premium required by the 
bank to compensate for its bearing of interest rate risk via offering mismatched fixed 
rate loans. 
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  Wong (2013) is a more related study to my dissertation. This dissertation explores 
an optimal decision for a bank on the choice of two loan contracts and relates it to 
second-order risk attitude and FED. In contrast to the findings of Chang et al. (1995), 
Wong (2013), under a state-dependent framework, shows that a non-positive spread 
between fixed and variable rate loans is a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
the bank to refrain from extending fixed rate loan if the marginal cost of funds is pos-
itively correlated with the state variable in the sense of FED of Wright (1987), and if 
the bank's preference exhibits correlation loving in the sense of Eeckhoudt et al. 
(2007).  
 Wong (2014) re-examines the result of Wong (2013) and investigates how the com-
petitive bank of regret aversion preference reacts to the two loan choices when facing 
the uncertainty of cost of fund. He concludes that a negative spread between fixed 
and variable rate loans is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the dominance 
of variable rate loans over fixed rate loans. By extending some fixed rate loans, the 
bank can hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized marginal cost of 
funds turns out to be small. 
Some Concepts of Expectation Dependence 
  The concept of correlation serves as a popular measure of dependence. However, 
correlation is often too weak to draw meaningful conclusion in many economic and 
financial applications. Given this Wright (1987) and Li (2011) introduce the FED 
and SED into the economics literature and since then there are many economic and 
financial applications. Wright (1987) uses expectation dependence to study portfolio 
problem and asset allocation. Li (2011) studies the demand for a risky asset in the 
presence of financial risk and background risk. Dionne et al. (2015) uses first- and 
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second-order expectation dependence to solve the equity premium puzzle in the con-
sumption-based CAPM. They both are stronger definitions of dependence than corre-
lation (Li, 2011). 
   ! and " are two continuous random variables. # $, &  is the joint distribution. '( $  and )* &  are the marginal distributions with respect to ! and ".  
Definition 2.1 ! is positively first-order expectation dependent on " if  
. 
Definition 2.2 ! is positively second-order expectation dependent on " if 
. 
  It is well acknowledged that SED is a weaker definition of dependence than FED, 
which has been convincingly argued by Li (2011). The advantage of SED in an em-
pirical setting will be further discussed in section 3.1. 
Some Concepts of Risk Attitude 
  Prudence and imprudence, known as the third-order risk attitudes, are introduced to 
economic literature to describe a decision maker’s preference when facing risk allo-
cation problem. In a two-risk framework (health and wealth) of Eeckhoudt and 
Schlesinger (2006), the prudent individual prefers to undertaking risk of health when 
the level of wealth is higher but the imprudent has the reverse choice of decision. 
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) conclude that the prudent are more concerned 
with downside risk than the imprudent. Both theoretical (Crainich et al., 2013) and 
experimental study (Noussair et.al, 2014) suggest the prevalence of prudent.  
FED(X y) = E(X)− E(X Y ≤ y) = [H (x, y)GY (y)
− FX (x)]dx ≥ 0−∞
+∞
∫
SED(X y) = [E(X)− E(X Y ≤ z)
−∞
y
∫ ]⋅GY (z)dz ≥ 0
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  Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) introduce the following ideas. Let +($, &) de-
note the utility function, and let +. denote /+//$ and +1 denote /+//&. I follow 
the same subscripts convention for the functions +.1, 2+.11 , and so on. Assume all 
the partial derivatives exist. 
Definition 2.3 An individual is correlation averse if and only if +.1 ≤ 0 for all $ 
and &. 
Definition 2.4 An individual is correlation loving if and only if +.1 ≥ 0 for all $ 
and &. 
  For example, a bank only considers two of interest, profit and the state of econo-
my. The correlation loving bank always prefers a 50-50 gamble of a loss in profit 
when the state of economy is bad to a 50-50 gamble of a loss in profit when the state 
of economy is good. Analogically, the correlation averse bank always prefers a 50-50 
gamble of a loss in profit when the state of economy is good to another 50-50 gamble 
of a loss in profit when the state of economy is bad. Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) summa-
rize that, for a correlation averse individual, a higher level of one condition mitigates 
the detrimental effect of a reduction in another one. 
Definition 2.5 An individual is cross-prudent with respect to "  if and only if +.11 2≥ 0 for all $ and &. 
Definition 2.6 An individual is cross-imprudent with respect to " if and only if +.11 ≤ 0 for all $ and &. 
  One considers the state of economic contains a level of uncertainty. The cross pru-
dent bank always prefers to add the economic state risk to high profit rather than to 
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the low profit. However, the cross imprudent bank always prefers to add the econom-
ic state risk to low profit rather than to the high profit. 
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HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND THEORETICAL MODEL 
Test for the Signs of FED and SED  
  The applicability and testability of Wong (2013) in an empirical setting root in a 
condition that the sign of FED is consistently positive or negative over economies.  
  In this section, I test the signs of FED and SED in an empirical setting. The result 
shows FED is not consistently positive but the sign of the SED is highly consistent, 
which is in line with the argument that SED is weaker than FED (Li, 2011). The re-
sult also suggests that the condition for FED detailed in Wong (2013) is not satisfied 
and thus not convenient for practical usage. 
  U.S. stock market index return, S&P 500, is commonly used as proxy of the state 
of economy. While, in practice, the majority of the U.S. banks use 12-month LIBOR 
in U.S. dollar denomination as base rate to construct a mortgage contract with varia-
ble rate in which the lending rate is the 12-month LIBOR plus a mark-up. Thus 12-
month LIBOR can be regarded as reference rate for the cost of funds for banks.  
  The data is collected from Datastream spanning from 1 January, 1986, when LI-
BOR officially commenced, to 31 Dec, 2012. Initially I have 6,824 daily observa-
tions for 12-month LIBOR and 6,808 daily observations of S&P 500 daily returns. 
Due to different trading days in the two markets, data is not perfectly matched and 
thus a pair of 6,663 daily observations is left in the final sample pool. Table 3.1 show 
the statistic summary of the 12-month LIBOR and The daily return of S&P 500. 
(Insert: Table 3.1: The statistic summary of the 12-month LIBOR and the daily return of S&P 500 for 
the period of Jan 1, 1986 to December 31, 2012) 
   A recent developed inference procedure detailed in Zhu et al. (2015) is employed 
to strictly test the signs of FED and SED in this empirical setting. The method is 
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shown to well control type I error and to be consistent against alternative hypothesis. 
To be specific, I write the following hypotheses.  
#6789: 12-month LIBOR is positively first-order expectation dependent on daily re-
turn of S&P 500 over states of economy.  
#.789: 12-month LIBOR is not all positively first-order expectation dependent on 
daily return of S&P 500 over states of economy.  
  To test for positive FED, one can state the null hypothesis #6789 and the alterna-
tive hypothesis #.789 as follows: 
 for all z; 
 for some z; 
  where I ∙  denotes indicator function and n is the sample size.   
  The decision rule is based on a test statistic of Kolmogorov-Simirnov type 
; 
 ; 
,  , and n is sample size. 
  Analogously, one may test for positive SED as follows: 
 for all z; 
 for some z. 
  One may construct the test statistic as follows: 
H0FED :−cov X, I(Y > z)( ) ≤ 0
H1FED :−cov X, I(Y > z)( ) > 0
TnFED = sup n DnFED (z)( )
DnFED (y) = −
1
n (xi − X)[I(yi > z)−i=1
n∑ I(Y > z)]
X = xi / ni=1
n∑ I(Y > z) = I(yi > z)i=1
n∑ / n
H0SED : cov(X,(z −Y )+ ≤ 0
H1SED : cov(X,(z −Y )+ > 0
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; 
where ; 
, . 
  To compute approximate empirical p-values for positive FED and SED tests, I per-
form a Monte Carlo approximation with 200 times replication proposed.  
  Generate i.i.d. random variables <= =>.?  from N(0,1) and denote the following 
processes:  
; 
. 
  By this construction, P-values for FED and SED tests are computed as follows: 
; 
. 
where PABC and PDBC are respectively the p-values for FED and SED tests, averag-
ing is made on R replications by independently generating the random variable sets V VF F>.G . Here I set the number of replications R=200. When P-value is smaller than 
a given significant value α, I then reject the null hypothesis. Here α=5%. 
  The null hypothesis that 12-month LIBOR is positively first-order expectation de-
pendent on the daily return of S&P 500 is rejected at 5% significance level. While 
TnSED = sup nDnSED (z)
DnSED (z) =
1
n (xi − X) (z − yi )+ − (z −Y )+⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }i=1
n
∑
X = xi / ni=1
n∑ (z −Y )+ = (z − yi )+ / ni=1
n∑
ΔFED (z,DnFED (z),V( ) = 1n −(xi − X) I(Y > z)− I(Y > z)( )− Dn
FED (z){ }
i=1
n
∑ Vi
ΔSED (z,DnSED (z),V( ) = 1n (xi − X) (z − yi )+ − (z −Y )+( )− Dn
FED (z){ }
i=1
n
∑ Vi
PFED ≈ 1R maxΔ
FED (z,DnFED (z),V j( ) > TnFED {(xi , yi ),i = 1,...,n}{ }
j=1
R
∑
PSED ≈ 1R maxΔ
SED (z,DnSED (z),V j( ) > TnFED {(xi , yi ),i = 1,...,n}{ }
j=1
R
∑
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the alternative null hypothesis that 12-month LIBOR is positively second-order ex-
pectation dependent on the daily return of S&P 500 cannot be rejected at 5% signifi-
cance level. To be specific, I7892is approximately 2.35% while IJ892is approxi-
mately 47.80%. 
  Here, the signs of FED and SED are tested using a pair of real data, which have 
significant impact on bank loan’s policy. Despite the particular environment setting, 
the test implies that the SED is more applicable for empirical study since it shows a 
consistent sign over states of economy and that the condition detailed in Wong 
(2013) appears inconvenient for such purpose. 
The Model   
  In this section, I delineate the model and derive the results in details. Following 
Wong (2013), I consider a bank that makes decisions in a single period horizon with 
two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, the bank extends two homogeneous classes of fixed 
rate and variable rate loans, all of which mature at date 1.  
  I assume that the marginal cost of fund, KL , is stochastic and distributed to a 
known marginal cumulative distribution function (CDF), ' ML , over support ML, ML , where 0 < 2 ML ≤ 2 ML .  
  The bank’s profit at date 1, , is given by 
 (1) 
OP and OQ are the amounts of fixed rate and variable rate loans, O is the total average 
balance of loans extended, i.e., O = OP + OQ, MP is the fixed rate and the variable rate 
is priced at KL +T , where T is an additive mark-up exogenously determined by 
Π
Π = rf ⋅ l f + (Rd +m) ⋅ lv − Rd ⋅ l −C(l)
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the market condition. U ∙  is a known cost function associated servicing loans, and I 
assume the following holds for all O ≥ 0, 
. 
  I assume that the bank possesses a state-dependent preference that is defined as, + V, W , where V and W represent the profit and the states of economy.  
  Besides, I assume the economic state, W, stochastic and distributed to a marginal 
cumulative distribution function CDF, G s  over support s, s . I denote H r\, s  is 
the joint CDF of R\ and S over support r\, r\ × s, s . 
  At date 0, the bank chooses classes of loans and their corresponding amounts so as 
to maximize its expected utility at date 1, i.e., max` a V, W .  
Proposition 
  The sufficient but not necessary condition for the bank to refrain from extending 
fixed rate loans is that (1) the spread between fixed rate and variable rate is non-
positive, (2) the cost of fund is positively (negatively) second-order dependent on the 
state of economy, (3) the bank exhibits correlation loving (correlation averse) and 
cross imprudence (cross prudent). 
Proof 
  The optimal amounts of fixed rate loans and variable rate loans, OP∗  and OQ∗  that 
maximize the bank’s utility must satisfy the following Kuhn-Tuck conditions:  
,   2	  
C ' ⋅( ) > 0,  C '' ⋅( ) > 0,  C 0( ) = 0
E{uΠ (Π*,S) ⋅[rf − Rd −C '(l*)]} ≤ 0
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,   3	  
,   4	  
, 
and 
  5	  
 
 and .      6	  
  Throughout this dissertation, asterisk ∗  signifies the optimal amounts, and the 
subscripts indicate the partial derivatives.   
  If the optimal choice is to exclusively extend variable rate loans, i.e., OP∗222 = 0 and OQ∗222 = 0, condition (2) must hold with inequality and condition (4) must hold with 
equality.  
 
  7	  
   8	  
  It is well known that for any two random variables has following property: 
. 
Substitute ! and " with ac V, W  and KL. I yield the follows: 
l f* ⋅E{uΠ (Π*,S) ⋅[rf − Rd −C '(l*)]} = 0
E{uΠ (Π*,S) ⋅[m −C '  (l)]} ≤ 0
lv* ⋅E{uΠ (Π*,S) ⋅[m −C '  (l*)]} = 0
lv* ≥ 0 l f* ≥ 0
rf −
E{u(Π*,S) ⋅Rd}
E{u(Π*,S)} −C(l
*) ≤ 0
m −C ' (l*) = 0
Cov(X,Y ) = E(XY )− E(X)E(Y )
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.                9	  
  In the equivalent theoretical framework, Wong (2013) proves the follows: 
 .              10	  
  Then, apply integration by parts the right hand side of equation (10), I yield the 
follows:  
.       (11) 
  After simple manipulation, I can re-write equation (11) as follows. 
.         
(12) 
  ` KL < `∅ KL  holds true from the deduction of equation (9) and equation (12) 
if the following conditions are satisfied,  
a.! , 
b.! , 
c.! , 
or  
a.! , 
Eφ (Rd ) =
E{u(Π*,S) ⋅Rd}
E{uΠ (Π*,S)}
= E(Rd )+
cov{u(Π*,S),Rd}
E{u(Π*,S)}
cov uΠ (π *, s),Rd{ } = FED(Rd s) ⋅uΠS (π *, s) ⋅G(s)dss
s
∫
cov uΠ (π *, s),Rd{ } = SED(Rd s) ⋅uΠS (π *, s) ss − SED(Rd s) ⋅uΠSS (π *, s)dss
s
∫
cov uΠ (π *, s),Rd{ } = SED(Rd s) ⋅uΠS (π *, s )− SED(Rd s) ⋅uΠSS (π *, s)dss
s
∫
SED(Rd s) ≥ 0 for all s∈ s, s[ ]
uΠS (π *, s) > 0 for all s=s
uΠSS (π *, s) < 0 for all s∈ s, s[ ]
SED(Rd s) <0 for all s∈ s, s[ ]
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b.! , 
c.! . 
Then, it is obvious that  
. 
Q.E.D 
  To summarize, the sufficient but not necessary condition for the bank to refrain 
from extending fixed rate loans is that (1) the spread between fixed rate and variable 
rate is non-positive, (2) the cost of fund is positively (negatively) second-order de-
pendent on the state of economy, (3) the bank exhibits correlation loving (correlation 
averse) and cross imprudence (cross prudent). 
  Recall the result in Wong (2013), the sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
bank to refrain from extending fixed rate loans is that (1) the spread between fixed 
rate and variable rate is non-positive, (2) the marginal cost of fund is positively first-
order dependent on the state of economy, (3) the bank exhibits correlation loving. 
  Admittedly, there is no much difference from the appearance. However, my result 
differs from Wong (2013) by two. First, the section 3.1 clearly demonstrates that the 
need for developing a condition under SED. In addition, right now it seems the only 
model that can be practically investigated in an empirical setting. Second, the exten-
sion to the SED is indeed at the cost of more restrictions on the risk attitudes. How-
ever, by that, how the third-order risk attitude affects a bank’s decision is determined 
and in chapter 4 can be, for the first time, investigated in an empirical setting.    
uΠS (π *, s) < 0 for all s=s
uΠSS (π *, s) > 0 for all s∈ s, s[ ]
rf − Eφ (Rd )−m ≤ 0⇒ rf − E(Rd )−m ≤ 0
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EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
  In this chapter, I aim to conduct a non-parametric calibration to test robustness of 
the model and investigate the third-order risk attitude in an empirical setting. To 
conduct such calibration, the selected empirical environment must be as close as pos-
sible to the theoretical settings detailed in chapter 3, equivalent to Wong (2013). 
Those are: (1) the bank faces two classes of homogeneous loans; (2) the loan prefer-
ence for each bank is either disclosed or can be inferred; (3) the spread between the 
fixed rate and variable rate can be well approximated. Given that, I regard U.S. prime 
mortgage market is an ideal empirical setting for that purpose since the three im-
portant requirements are all satisfied. First, prime mortgages, by definition, are those 
that meet the standards for quality mortgages set out by The Federal National Mort-
gage Association (Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) and thus are of similar credit condition. Secondly, loan preference is 
disclosed by the bank itself or can be inferred by the decision rules I construct, which 
will be detailed in the followings. Thirdly, the reference/base rate in a variable rate 
mortgage is usually 12-month LIBOR, which adjusts with the market, and the mark-
up varies by banks and by periods. Despite of that, the sign of the spread between the 
fixed rate and the variable rate remains quite stable. To be specific, I employ the fol-
lowing steps to conduct the calibration.  
   Step 1, download a list of U.S. commercial banks registered in the United states 
and are still in operation as of the end of year 2012 from Compustat. Initially the list 
includes 615 banking firms, however, due to time constraint, I decide to investigate 
the first 110 banks by firm size, whose assets account for 94.34% of total of the 615 
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banking firms. The 110 banks are listed in descending order by firm size in table 4.1 
in the Chapter 7 in chapter 7.  
(Insert Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks.) 
  Step 2, determine the loan preference between the 30-year fixed rate mortgage and 
30-year adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)1 for each bank of the selected 110 banking 
firms according to following decision rules in the 10-K files2. The 10-K files are 
banking firms’ financial reports and collected from U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  
a.! The bank makes a clear statement on their mortgage preference between fixed 
and variable rate mortgage.  
For example: “In general, we sell the majority of our conforming fixed rate loan 
originations in the secondary market and retain the majority of our non-
conforming and adjustable-rate mortgage loans.” 
b.! 40% or more ARM share in the bank’s retained prime mortgage portfolio implies 
the bank has preference for ARM. This rule is constructed because of a survey 
conducted by Freddie Mac. The survey indicates that the average monthly ARM 
shares of applications is 17.21%, with high at 36% in March 1995, from Jan 1995 
to Dec 2013. It appears clear that the ARM share would not increase if the bank 
does not intentionally seek for re-sell FRM or purchase ARM in the secondary 
market. And 40% is for the nature of conservativeness. 
                                               
1 In U.S. prime mortgage market, there is, in fact, no pure variable rate mortgage. 1-year adjustable 
mortgage in which initial interest rate is fixed for a period of one year and then resets to a floating rate 
for the remaining loan period, is the closest one to the pure variable mortgage and is most suitable 
proxy for our research purpose. 
2 The annual report on Form 10-K provides a comprehensive overview of the company's business and 
financial condition and includes audited financial statements. !
19!!
  According to the decision rules, banks’ loan preferences out of the selected sample 
can be determined. Of the 39 banks, 27 shows clear loan preference for adjustable 
rate mortgage. Table 4.2 shows the summary of statistics of the sample of 39 banking 
firms and Table 4.3-4.4 is the list of banks that have preference for ARM and non-
ARM3 in the sample of 39 banking firms. 
(Insert Table 4.2: The summary of statistics of the sample of 39 banking firms.) 
(Insert Table 4.3: The list of banks that have preference for ARM in the sample of 39 banking firms.) 
(Insert Table 4.4: The list of banks that do not have preference for ARM in the sample of 39 banking 
firms.) 
  Step 3, the spread between the FRM and ARM is calculated upon one assumption 
that the U.S. prime mortgage market is highly competitive and thus funding rate is 
predetermined by the market. And, the mark-up and the fixed rate should be almost 
homogeneous at least for the same length of mortgage. Given that, the mark-
up/margin and fixed rate are the same for each bank. To yield the spread, the average 
weekly data in total 51 observations for each fixed rate mortgage and margin rate are 
collected from 2013 Weekly Mortgage Rates Data issued by Freddie Mac. Table 4.5 
enclosed in the Appendix is the full content of 2013 Weekly Mortgage Rates Data 
with respects to rates.  
(Insert Table 4.5: Rates with 30-yr FRM and 1yr ARM from 2013 Weekly Mortgage Rates Date) 
 
a.! Calculate the sample mean by   
b.! Evaluate the spread with corresponding MP and the mark-up T   
                                               
3 Banks have preference for Non-ARM referring to those banks that do not have mortgage preference 
for ARM. 
Spread = rf − E(Rd )−m
E(Rd ) = rdi
i=1
n
∑
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Where r\F  is the i-th daily observation of 12-month LIBOR, re is the fixed rate, n is 
the number of the observations.  
  By this, we yield a non-positive spread.  
  Step 4, running hypothesis test for the signs of SED between the cost of fund and 
the state of economy, i.e. the 12-month LIBOR and the daily return of S&P 500. The 
test result is detailed in section 3.1, which suggests that the cost of fund is positively 
second-order expectation dependent on the state of economy.  
  Step 5, determine the bank’s second and third-order risk attitudes, i.e. correlation 
loving or correlation averse for second-order risk attitudes, or cross prudent or cross 
imprudent for third-order risk attitudes. Banks are presumably “protected” under 
TBTF as discussed earlier. I arbitrarily set correlation loving and cross imprudent as 
the second and the third risk attitudes for banks in response to the argument (IMF, 
2014).  
  Step 6, calibrate the model  
  It is obvious that the predetermined satisfies the sufficient (but not necessary) con-
ditions detailed in chapter 3 and thus the calibration implies the dominance of ARM, 
which is consistent with the empirical findings that of 39, 27 banks have loan prefer-
ence for ARM.   
  In addition, as presented in Table 4.2, the size of the bank that has preference for 
ARM is generally larger than that of the bank that has preference for FRM. To be 
specific, the average total asset of ARM banks is USD 33,818 million while that of 
the FRM banks is USD 13,031 million. This is in line with the argument that TBTF 
roots in the fact that the failure of large complex financial firms would generate 
large, undesirable externalities in the whole financial system. There can be many 
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possible explanations. One of them, although not conclusive, is that large banks are 
more “protected” against the downside risk by the TBTF and therefore are more will-
ing to take more risks than small banks.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I re-examine Wong (2013) on the optimal mix of fixed and vari-
able rate loans of a bank under state-dependent framework equivalent. I use a recent 
developed inference procedure along with a pair of real world data to run hypothesis 
tests on the signs of FED and SED. This attempt has not been conducted in an empir-
ical environment. The result indicates that the sign of SED is relatively more stable 
than that of FED and thus the conditions with respect to FED detailed in Wong 
(2013) appears not convenient for practical usage. Moreover, the TBTF implies that 
large banks receive special “protection” against failure and may encourage them to 
take more risk than they should have. In particular, the “protection” is against down-
side risk, which relates to banks’ third-order risk attitudes. In an attempt to determine 
the optimal decision when facing risk allocation, the third-order risk attitude must be 
examined. However, prior study has not yet touched that area.  
  Therefore, a set of conditions are derived in favor of practical usage and further 
investigation on third-order risk attitudes in an empirical setting. I propose weaker 
sufficient conditions for banks to refrain from extending fixed rate loans that the 
spread between fixed rate and variable rate is non-positive if the cost of fund is posi-
tively second-order expectation dependent on the state of economy and if the bank 
exhibits correlation loving and cross imprudence preferences. 
  To examine the robustness, I hand-collect a set of data to run a non-parametric cal-
ibration on my model. With a set of predetermined values, my model forecasts that 
banks would primarily extend ARM. The result with is highly consistent with the 
prevalence of banks that have preference for ARM. The coincidence that larger 
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banks prefer ARM to FRM suggests that larger banks are more risk taking than small 
banks and thus TBTF seems unsolved.  
  The model is restricted to the supply side of the loan market. It is of great interest 
to investigate the robustness of my results if the demand side and the credit risk are 
also taken into consideration. Furthermore, the empirical finding with respects to the 
dominance of risk taking banks suggests the traditional views on banks’ risk attitude 
as risk-averse firms may be incorrect. I leave this extension for future research. 
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Table 3.1: The summary of statistics of the 12-month LIBOR and the daily return of S&P 500 for the 
period of Jan 1, 1986 to December 31, 2012 
Variable Number  of Obs Mean % Std. Dev. % Min % Max % 
S&P 500 6,663 0.036 1.193 -20.470 11.580 
12-month LIBOR 6,663 4.743 2.490 0.720 11.375 
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks 
Ranking by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year 
Ticker 
Symbol Company Name Total Assets  
1 2012 JPM JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 2,359,141  
2 2012 BAC BANK OF AMERICA CORP 2,209,974  
3 2012 WFC WELLS FARGO & CO 1,422,968  
4 2012 BK BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 358,990  
5 2012 USB U S BANCORP 353,855  
6 2012 PNC PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 305,107  
7 2012 STT STATE STREET CORP 222,582  
8 2012 HBC2 HSBC USA INC 196,567  
9 2012 BBT BB&T CORP 183,872  
10 2012 STI SUNTRUST BANKS INC 173,442  
11 2012 FITB FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 121,894  
12 2012 RF REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 121,347  
13 2012 NTRS NORTHERN TRUST CORP 97,464  
14 2012 BTM1 UNIONBANCAL CORP 96,992  
15 2012 KEY KEYCORP 89,236  
16 2012 STD2 SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC 85,790  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name Total Assets  
17 2012 MTB M & T BANK CORP 83,009  
18 2012 CMA COMERICA INC 65,359  
19 2012 HBAN HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 56,153  
20 2012 ZION ZIONS BANCORPORATION 55,512  
21 2012 NYCB NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 44,145  
22 2012 HCBK HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 40,596  
23 2012 FNFG FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP 36,806  
24 2012 BPOP POPULAR INC 36,508  
25 2012 FRC FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 34,388  
26 2012 PBCT PEOPLE'S UNITED FINL INC 30,324  
27 2012 CYN CITY NATIONAL CORP 28,618  
28 2012 BOKF BOK FINANCIAL CORP 28,149  
29 2012 SNV SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 26,760  
30 2012 FHN FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 25,520  
31 2012 ASBC ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 23,488  
32 2012 CFR CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 23,124  
33 2012 SIVB SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 22,766  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name Total Assets  
34 2012 EWBC EAST WEST BANCORP INC 22,536  
35 2012 CBSH COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 22,160  
36 2012 FCNCA FIRST CITIZENS BANCSH  -CL A 21,284  
37 2012 WBS WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 20,147  
38 2012 HBHC HANCOCK HOLDING CO 19,464  
39 2012 EVER EVERBANK FINANCIAL CORP 18,243  
40 2012 TCB TCF FINANCIAL CORP 18,226  
41 2012 SUSQ SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 18,038  
42 2012 WTFC WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 17,520  
43 2012 SBNY SIGNATURE BANK/NY 17,456  
44 2012 FULT FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 16,528  
45 2012 AF ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 16,497  
46 2012 VLY VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 16,013  
47 2012 UMBF UMB FINANCIAL CORP 14,927  
48 2012 FMER FIRSTMERIT CORP 14,913  
49 2012 PB PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 14,584  
50 2012 FBC FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 14,082  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name 
Total Assets 
($ million) 
51 2012 PVTB PRIVATEBANCORP INC 14,058  
52 2012 BOH BANK OF HAWAII CORP 13,728  
53 2012 BXS BANCORPSOUTH INC 13,397  
54 2012 IBKC IBERIABANK CORP 13,130  
55 2012 FBP FIRST BANCORP P R 13,100  
56 2012 ISBC INVESTORS BANCORP INC 12,723  
57 2012 WAFD WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 12,473  
58 2012 BKU BANKUNITED INC 12,376  
59 2012 FNB F N B CORP/FL 12,024  
60 2012 IBOC INTL BANCSHARES CORP 11,883  
61 2012 UMPQ UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 11,795  
62 2012 TFSL TFS FINANCIAL CORP 11,518  
63 2012 CATY CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 10,694  
64 2012 TCBI TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES INC 10,541  
65 2012 TRMK TRUSTMARK CORP 9,829  
66 2012 CRBC CITIZENS REPUBLIC BANCORP 9,587  
67 2012 MBFI MB FINANCIAL INC/MD 9,576  
68 2012 ONB OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 9,544  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name 
Total Assets 
($ million)  
69 2012 CFFN CAPITOL FEDERAL FINL INC 9,378  
70 2012 STSA STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA 9,237  
71 2012 OFG OFG BANCORP 9,193  
72 2012 NPBC NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC 8,530  
73 2012 UBSI UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 8,420  
74 2012 FCBN FIRST CITIZENS BANCORP INC 8,236  
75 2012 FMBI FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 8,100  
76 2012 NWBI NORTHWEST BANCSHARES INC 7,943  
77 2012 GBCI GLACIER BANCORP INC 7,747  
78 2012 FIBK FIRST INTERSTATE BANCSYSTEM 7,722  
79 2012 WAL WESTERN ALLIANCE BANCORP 7,623  
80 2012 CBU COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 7,497  
81 2012 CBF CAPITAL BANK FINANCIAL CORP 7,296  
82 2012 PFS PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SVCS INC 7,284  
83 2012 UCBI UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 6,802  
84 2012 PRK PARK NATIONAL CORP 6,643  
85 2012 0450B FIRST BANKS INC 6,509  
86 2012 FFBC FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH 6,497  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name 
Total Assets 
($ million)  
87 2012 BPFH BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS 6,465  
88 2012 CVBF CVB FINANCIAL CORP 6,363  
89 2012 WSBC WESBANCO INC 6,079  
90 2012 NBTB N B T BANCORP INC 6,042  
91 2012 BANF BANCFIRST CORP/OK 6,022  
92 2012 FCF FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA 5,995  
93 2012 CHFC CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 5,917  
94 2012 TAYC TAYLOR CAPITAL GROUP INC 5,802  
95 2012 INDB INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MA 5,757  
96 2012 OCN OCWEN FINANCIAL CORP 5,672  
97 2012 BBCN BBCN BANCORP INC 5,641  
98 2012 PACW PACWEST BANCORP 5,464  
99 2012 NBHC NATIONAL BANK HLDGS CORP 5,411  
100 2012 BHLB BERKSHIRE HILLS BANCORP INC 5,297  
101 2012 BRKL BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 5,148  
102 2012 SCBT FIRST FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC 5,136  
103 2012 PNFP PINNACLE FINL PARTNERS INC 5,041  
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Table 4.1: The list of 110 banks (continued) 
Ranking 
by  
Firm Size 
Fiscal  
Year Ticker Symbol Company Name 
Total Assets 
($ million)  
104 2012 BNCL BENEFICIAL MUTUAL BANCORP 5,006  
105 2012 HTLF HEARTLAND FINANCIAL USA INC 4,991  
106 2012 WABC WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 4,952  
107 2012 COLB COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC 4,906  
108 2012 TMP TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP 4,837  
109 2012 SRCE 1ST SOURCE CORP 4,551  
110 2012 STBA S & T BANCORP INC 4,527  
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Table 4.2: The summary of statistics of the sample of 39 banking firms 
  Total Sample ARM Non-ARM 
Number of obs 39 27 12 
Average Asset 
($ million) 27,422 33,819 13,031 
Standard Deviation 40,428 47,905 6,651 
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Table 4.3: The list of banks that have preference for ARM in the sample of 39 banking firms 
Ranking 
 in sample* 
Ranking 
 in population** Company Name 
Total Asset 
 
($ million)     
Loan Preference for ARM 
1 8 HSBC USA INC 196,567 
2 9 BB&T CORP 183,872 
3 18 COMERICA INC 65,359 
4 19 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 56,153 
5 21 NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 44,145 
6 22 HUDSON CITY BAN-CORP INC 40,596 
7 23 FIRST NIAGARA FI-NANCIAL GRP 36,806 
8 25 FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 34,388 
9 26 PEOPLE'S UNITED FINL INC 30,324 
11 28 BOK FINANCIAL CORP 28,149 
12 31 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 23,488 
14 38 HANCOCK HOLDING CO 19,464 
15 42 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 17,520 
16 43 SIGNATURE BANK/NY 17,456 
* There are 39 banking firms in the sample 
**The population includes 615 banking firms 
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Table 4.4: The list of banks that do not have preference for ARM in the sample of 39 banking firms 
Ranking 
in sample 
Ranking 
in population Company Name 
Total Asset 
($ million)    
Loan Preference for non-ARM 
10 27 CITY NATIONAL CORP 28,618 
13 35 COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 22,160 
18 47 UMB FINANCIAL CORP 14,927 
21 51 PRIVATEBANCORP INC 14,058 
22 52 BANK OF HAWAII CORP 13,728 
24 55 FIRST BANCORP P R 13,100 
25 61 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 11,795 
27 71 OFG BANCORP 9,193 
28 73 UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 8,420 
31 80 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 7,497 
32 83 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 6,802 
35 89 WESBANCO INC 6,079 
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Table 4.5: Rates with 30-year FRM and 1yr ARM from 2013 Weekly Mortgage Rates Date 
  U.S. U.S. 30-year FRM/ 
 
30-year 1-year ARM 1-year ARM 
Week FRM margin spread 
1/3 3.34 2.76 0.77 
1/10 3.40 2.74 0.80 
1/17 3.38 2.76 0.81 
1/24 3.42 2.76 0.85 
1/31 3.53 2.76 0.94 
2/7 3.53 2.76 1.00 
2/14 3.53 2.76 0.92 
2/21 3.56 2.76 0.91 
2/28 3.51 2.76 0.87 
3/7 3.52 2.76 0.89 
3/14 3.63 2.76 0.99 
3/21 3.54 2.75 0.91 
3/28 3.57 2.75 0.95 
4/4 3.54 2.76 0.91 
4/11 3.43 2.75 0.81 
4/18 3.41 2.75 0.78 
4/25 3.40 2.76 0.78 
5/2 3.35 2.76 0.79 
5/9 3.42 2.76 0.89 
5/16 3.51 2.77 0.96 
5/23 3.59 2.76 1.04 
5/30 3.81 2.77 1.27 
6/6 3.91 2.76 1.33 
6/13 3.98 2.76 1.40 
6/20 3.93 2.77 1.36 
6/27 4.46 2.77 1.80 
7/3 4.29 2.77 1.63 
7/11 4.51 2.77 1.85 
7/18 4.37 2.75 1.71 
7/25 4.31 2.75 1.66 
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Table 4.5: Rates with 30-year FRM and 1yr ARM from 2013 Weekly Mortgage Rates Date (contin-
ued) 
  U.S. U.S. 30-year FRM/ 
 30-year 1-year ARM 1-year ARM 
Week FRM margin spread 
8/1 4.39 2.74 1.75 
8/8 4.40 2.75 1.78 
8/15 4.40 2.76 1.73 
8/22 4.58 2.77 1.91 
8/29 4.51 2.76 1.87 
9/5 4.57 2.77 1.86 
9/12 4.57 2.77 1.90 
9/19 4.50 2.75 1.85 
9/26 4.32 2.76 1.69 
10/3 4.22 2.77 1.59 
10/10 4.23 2.77 1.59 
10/17 4.28 2.77 1.65 
10/24 4.13 2.77 1.53 
10/31 4.10 2.76 1.46 
11/7 4.16 2.77 1.55 
11/14 4.35 2.75 1.74 
11/21 4.22 2.75 1.61 
11/27 4.29 2.76 1.69 
12/5 4.46 2.75 1.87 
12/12 4.42 2.75 1.91 
12/19 4.47 2.74 1.90 
12/26 4.48 2.75 1.92 
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